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Abstract
Social dilemmas are an integral part of social interactions. Cooperative actions, ranging from secret-
ing extra-cellular products in microbial populations to donating blood in humans, are costly to the actor
and hence create an incentive to shirk and avoid the costs. Nevertheless, cooperation is ubiquitous
in nature. Both costs and benefits often depend non-linearly on the number and types of individuals
involved – as captured by idioms such as ‘too many cooks spoil the broth’ where additional contribu-
tions are discounted, or ‘two heads are better than one’ where cooperators synergistically enhance the
group benefit. Interaction group sizes may depend on the size of the population and hence on eco-
logical processes. This results in feedback mechanisms between ecological and evolutionary processes,
which jointly affect and determine the evolutionary trajectory. Only recently combined eco-evolutionary
processes became experimentally tractable in microbial social dilemmas. Here we analyse the evolution-
ary dynamics of non-linear social dilemmas in settings where the population fluctuates in size and the
environment changes over time. In particular, cooperation is often supported and maintained at high
densities through ecological fluctuations. Moreover, we find that the combination of the two processes
routinely reveals highly complex dynamics, which suggests common occurrence in nature.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of evolution is based on Darwinian selection, mutation and drift. These forces along
with neo-Darwinian additions of phenotypic variability, frequency-dependence and, in particular,
cooperative interactions within and between species, form the basis for major transitions in
evolution [1, 2]. Ecological effects such as varying population densities or changing environments
are typically assumed to be minimal because they often arise on faster timescales such that only
ecological averages matter for evolutionary processes. Consequently, evolutionary and ecological
dynamics have been studied independently for long. While this assumption is justified in some
situations, it does not apply whenever timescales of ecological and evolutionary dynamics are
comparable [3]. In such cases, ecological and evolutionary feedback may contribute to the
unfolding of the evolutionary process. Empirically, effects of changes in population size are
well documented [4–8] and has now lead to a burgeoning field in evolutionary theory, which
incorporates ecological variation [9–18].
In particular, the independent study of ecological and evolutionary processes may not be able
to capture the complex dynamics that often emerge in the combined system. Such potentially
rich eco-evolutionary dynamics has been explored theoretically and, more recently, empirically
confirmed [19–21]. Population genetics and adaptive dynamics readily embrace ecological sce-
narios [see e.g. 3, 22–32] whereas the traditional focus of evolutionary game theory lies on trait
frequencies or constant population sizes [33–35]. Here we propose ways to incorporate intricacies
of ecological dynamics along with environmental variation in evolutionary games.
A. Ecological setting
Evolutionary game dynamics is typically assumed to take place in a population of individu-
als with fixed types or ‘strategies’, which determine their behaviour in interactions with other
members of the population [36, 37]. Payoffs determine the success of each strategy. Strategies
that perform better than the average increase in abundance. This is the essence of the replicator
equation [34] but neglects that evolutionary changes may alter the population dynamics or vice
versa. Traditionally the population consists of two strategies whose frequencies are given by x
and y = 1−x. In order to incorporate ecological dynamics we assume that x and y are (normal-
ized) densities of the two strategies with x+ y ≤ 1 [38]. Consequently, z = 1− x− y provides
a measure for reproductive opportunities, e.g. available space. Ecological dynamics is reflected
in the change of the population density, x + y. The evolutionary dynamics of the strategies is
affected by intrinsic changes in population density as well as extrinsic sources such as seasonal
fluctuations in the interaction parameters and hence the payoffs. For example, in epidemiology
the coevolutionary dynamics of virulence and transmission rate of pathogens depends on eco-
logical parameters of the host population. More specifically, changes in the mortality rate of
hosts evokes a direct response in the transmission rate of pathogens while virulence covaries with
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transmission [27]. Another approach to implement eco-evolutionary feedback is, for example, to
explicitly model spatial structure and the resulting reproductive constraints [28, 39–41], which
then requires approximations in terms of weak selection or moment closures to derive an analyti-
cally tractable framework. In contrast, while our model neglects spatial correlations, it enables a
more detailed look at evolutionary consequences arising from intrinsically and extrinsically driven
ecological changes.
B. Non-linear social dilemmas
Social dilemmas occur whenever groups of cooperators perform better than groups of defectors
but in mixed groups defectors outcompete cooperators [42]. This creates conflicts of interest
between the individual and the group. In traditional (linear) public goods (PG) interactions
cooperators contribute a fixed amount c > 0 to a common pool, while defectors contribute
nothing. In a group of size N with m cooperators the payoff for defectors is PD(m) = rm c/N
where r > 1 denotes the multiplication factor of cooperative investments and reflects that the
public good is a valuable resource. Similarly, cooperators receive PC(m) = PD(m)−c = PD(m−
1) + rc/N − c, where the second equality highlights that cooperators ‘see’ one less cooperator
among their co-players and illustrates that the net costs of cooperation are −rc/N + c because a
share of the benefits produced by a cooperator returns to itself. Therefore, it becomes beneficial
to switch to cooperation for large multiplication factors, r > N , but defectors nevertheless
keep outperforming cooperators in mixed groups. The total investment in the PG is based on
the number of cooperators in the group but the benefits returned by the common resource
may depend non-linearly on the total investments. For example, the marginal benefits provided
additional cooperators may decrease, which is often termed diminishing returns. Conversely,
adding more cooperators could synergistically increase the benefits produced as in economies of
scale. While well studied in economics [43–45] such ideas were touched upon earlier in biology
[46] but only recently have they garnered renewed attention [26, 31, 47–53].
The nonlinearity in PG can be captured by introducing a parameter ω, which rescales the
effective value of contributions by cooperators based on the number of cooperators present [26].
Hence, the payoff for defectors, PD(m), and cooperators, PC(m), respectively, is given by,
PD(m) =
rc
N
(1 + ω + ω2 + . . .+ ωm−1) =
rc
N
1− ωm
1− ω (1a)
PC(m) = PD(m)− c = rc
N
ω(1 + ω + . . .+ ωm−2) +
rc
N
− c, (1b)
such that the benefits provided by each additional cooperator are either discounted, ω < 1, or syn-
ergistically enhanced, ω > 1. The classic, linear PG is recovered for ω = 1. This parametrization
provides a general framework for the study of cooperation and recovers all traditional scenarios
of social dilemmas as special cases [2, 26].
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II. ECO-EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS
The overall population density, x + y, can grow or shrink from 0 (extinction) to an absolute
maximum of 1 (normalization). The average payoffs of cooperators and defectors, fC and fD,
determine their respective birth rates but individuals can successfully reproduce if reproductive
opportunities, z > 0, are available. All individuals are assumed to die at equal and constant rate,
d. Formally, changes in frequencies of cooperators and defectors over time are governed by the
following extension of the replicator dynamics [38],
x˙ = x(zfC − d) (2a)
y˙ = y(zfD − d) (2b)
z˙ = −x˙− y˙ = (x+ y)d− z(xfC + yfD). (2c)
The average payoffs are calculated following Eq. 1, where the interaction group size depends on
the population density (see App. A). This extends the eco-evolutionary dynamics for the linear
PG [38] to account for discounted or synergistically enhanced accumulation of benefits [26]. The
difference in the average fitness between defectors and cooperators, F (x, z) = fD − fC is now
given by
F (x, z) = 1 + (r − 1)zN−1 − r
N
(1− x(1− ω))N − zN
1− z − x(1− ω) (3)
and provides a gradient of selection. Note that in the special case of the linear PG, ω = 1, Eq. 3
reduces to a function of z alone.
A. Intrinsic fluctuations
Homogenous defector populations go extinct but pure cooperator populations can persist and
withstand larger death rates d under synergy than discounting (see App. A 1, Figure 8). In order
to analyze the dynamics in heterogenous populations it is useful to rewrite Eq. 2 in terms of z
and the fraction of cooperators, f = x/(1− z):
f˙ =
x˙y − y˙x
(1− z)2 = −zf(1− f)F (f, z) (4a)
z˙ = −(1− z)(fz(r − 1)(1− zN−1)− d). (4b)
This change of variable introduces a convenient separation in terms evolutionary and ecological
dynamics: evolutionary changes affect strategy abundances and are captured by f , whereas
ecological dynamics are reflected in changes of the (normalized) population density, x+y = 1−z.
Eco-evolutionary trajectories are visualized in the phase plane (1− z, f) ∈ [0, 1]2. In contrast
to [38, 54, 55] the interior of the phase plane can support more than one fixed point, because
of the non-linearity introduced by synergy/discounting, see Fig. 1. In addition to the equilibria
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FIG. 1. Eco-evolutionary dynamics of public goods interactions with synergy/discounting in the (1− z, f)-
phase plane. Along the null-clines of Eq. 4 the population density (z˙ = 0, dashed line) or the population composition (f˙ = 0,
solid line) does not change. For ω = 1 the null-cline f˙ = 0 is a vertical line and hence admits at most one interior equilibrium
denoted by Q. The non-linearity introduced by synergy and discounting can admit a second interior equilibrium P. We set
the parameters to N = 8, d = 0.5 and illustrate the dynamics under discounting (ω < 1, left column), linear public goods
(ω = 1, middle column), and synergy (ω > 1, right column) for increasing r (top to bottom): (a) 2.2, (b) 2.7, (c) 2.8 and
(d) 5.0. The stability of the fixed points is discussed in App. B. Example trajectories are shown in red starting at the starred
initial configuration. Compared to the linear public goods (center column), synergistic benefits (right column) admit stable
co-existence at lower r whereas higher r are required for discounting (left column).
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FIG. 2. Internal fixed points for varying r. The z-null-cline (dashed lines), f = d/[z(r−1)(1− zN−1)] is independent
of synergy/discounting, ω. The f -null-cline (solid lines), is given by the solution of F (f, z) = 0. The null-clines are shown for
specific r (numerically explored range r ∈ [2, 7.95] in increments of ∆r = 0.05), where the stability of Q (solid circles) changes
and separates dynamical regimes: (i) unstable node (orange) (ii) unstable focus (light red) (iii) stable focus (light blue) (iv)
stable node (yellow). Between (ii) and (iii) (red) Andronov-Hopf and other complex bifurcations are possible [38, 55]. Only
under discounting or synergy another fixed point (P, open circle) may appear. (a) Discounting: both internal fixed points
appear for r = 2.65 where P is a saddle and Q an unstable node. While P exits the phase space immediately, Q is still present
for r = 7.5. (b) Linear public goods: only a single internal fixed point (Q) can exist and for its detailed stability analysis, see
[55]. (c) Synergy: Q is already present at r = 2 as an unstable focus, P appears at r = 2.35 as a saddle while Q is a stable
focus. Both fixed points persist until they annihilate each other close to r = 3.1. As ω increases, smaller r are sufficient to
render Q stable and prevent extinction.
along the boundary, interior equilibria of Eq. 4 are determined by the intersections of the two
null-clines given by f = d/[z(r − 1)(1 − zN−1)] (z˙ = 0) and solutions of F (f, z) = 0 (f˙ = 0).
Unfortunately an analytical stability analysis of the interior fixed point(s) is inaccessible but a
numerical analysis suggests that a single fixed point, Q, can exhibit various stability properties
depending on r, whereas the second fixed point, P, whenever present, is always a saddle (see
App. B).
Figure 2 depicts the null-clines for increasing r and fixed ω. The stability of Q defines four
dynamical regimes: for small r Q does not exist but when increasing r it (i) appears as an
unstable node, (ii) turns into an unstable focus, (iii) then becomes a stable focus and, finally,
(iv) a stable node beforeQ disappears again at high r. Similarly, changing ω with fixed r, triggers
a series of bifurcations because the f -null-cline depends on ω whereas the z-null-cline does not,
see Figure 3. Note that all f -null-clines run through the point defined by F (0, z) = 0 at the
lower boundary of the phase plane.
A detailed description of the changes in the stability of the fixed point Q and hence the
eventual dynamics is given in App. B. In Figures 2, 3 we describe the dynamics for some fixed
values of r and ω, i.e. the rate of return of the public good and the synergy/discounting factor.
However what would happen if the actual values of these parameters changed in a continous
fashion over time?
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FIG. 3. Internal fixed points for varying ω. The z-null-cline (f = d/[z(r − 1)(1− zN−1)], dashed line), and various
f -null-cline, (F (f, z) = 0, solid lines), are shown under synergy/discounting for ω ∈ [0.05, 2.0] and increments of ∆ω = 0.005.
The stability of Q again delineates different dynamical regimes. Note that depending on r not all four regimes may occur as is
the case in panels (a) and (d). Parameters are N = 8, d = 0.5 and r as (a) 2.2, (b) 2.7, (c) 2.8 and (d) 5.0. (i) at small ω the
fixed point(s) appear (except in (d) where already for ω = 0.05 both fixed points exist). Of the two fixed points, one is always
a saddle, P (open circles), whereas the other, Q (solid circles), typically enters the phase plane as an unstable node (orange).
(ii) Q becomes an unstable focus (light red). Between regions (ii) and (iii) (red) complex bifurcations are possible. (iii) Q is
a stable focus (light blue). (iv) Q turns into a stable node (yellow). For still larger ω the two interior fixed points collide and
annihilate each other.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL FLUCTUATIONS
A constant feature of evolutionary as well as ecological processes is their dynamic nature.
However, most evolutionary models assume a deterministic and usually constant environment
in which populations evolve – either deterministically or stochastically [33–35, 56]. Considering
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variable environments is a natural way of incorporating changing ecological conditions. Stochastic
or periodic fluctuations in the environment may alter evolutionary trajectories as has been shown
experimentally [57]. Variable environments have been considered for a variety of interesting
phenomena from bet hedging strategies and Red Queen dynamics to the evolution of sex [58, 59].
When considering stochastic dynamics, the fixation probability of a trait is a crucial determinant
of evolutionary change. In classical population genetics, it is possible to determine the fixation
probability under demographic fluctuations [60–62], temporally variable selection strength [63–
66] as well as both [67], provided that the fitness of traits is frequency independent. In contrast,
in evolutionary games and the evolution of cooperation, in particular, fitnesses are intrinsically
frequency dependent and a theoretical understanding of the effects of demographic fluctuations
and/or temporally fluctuating game parameters is nascent and has received sporadic attention
[28, 31, 38, 39, 41, 68–71].
Ecological variation can result from feedback between reproductive rates and population den-
sities – an intrinsic source of variation – or as a response to extrinsic changes of the environment,
which can be implemented by altering the interactions or by varying game parameters.
A. Variation of interaction types
In order to mimic seasonal variation, for example, consider two types of PG interactions,
discounting (D) and synergy (S), both with N = 8 and d = 0.5: In D benefits are discounted by
ωD = 0.9 but the multiplication factor is high, rD = 4.2, whereas in S benefits are synergistically
enhanced by ωS = 1.1 but for a lower multiplication factor, rS = 2.1. This combination of
parameter values ensures that groups of cooperators have the same fitness in D and S. With
probability pD(t) = (sin(at+ δ) + 1)/2 individuals engage in D and with pS(t) = 1−pD(t) in S,
i.e the probability to engage in one or the other type of interaction changes over time reflecting
changes in resource abundance or relating to seasonal tasks. The parameter a indicates the
relation between the timescales of environmental fluctuations and the eco-evolutionary dynamics
while δ tunes the phase of the oscillating wave. For a > 1 environmental fluctuations are faster
than the eco-evolutionary dynamics, slower for a < 1, and for a = 1 the two timescales are the
same. The dynamical equations, Eq. 4, thus become:
f˙ = − zf(1− f)[pD(t)F (f, z, rD, ωD) + pS(t)F (f, z, rS, ωS)] (5a)
z˙ = − (1− z)[zf ((pD(t)rD + pS(t)rS)− 1) (1− zN−1)− d]. (5b)
The gradient of selection, F (f, z), is split into F (f, z, rS, ωS) and F (f, z, rD, ωD) for the two
types of interactions. Based on numerical integration, the trajectories of periodic fluctuations
between D and S reveal qualitatively similar dynamical properties as the average interaction,
(D+S)/2, provided that environmental fluctuations are sufficiently fast (a > 1) (compare Fig. 4
with App. C and Fig. 10).
As pD(t) oscillates the location and even stability of the fixed point Q changes periodically,
see Fig. 4 for ωD = 0.9, ωS = 1.1, rD = 4.2, rS = 2.1, N = 8, and d = 0.5. In the pure
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D scenario, pD(t) = 1, Q is stable, while for pure S, pD(t) = 0, Q changes position and is
unstable (manipulate both at [72]). In order to illustrate the detailed dynamics, we consider the
stability of Q as a function of pD, which is indicated by the colours and cartoons in the top row
of Fig. 4. For small pD (S scenario), the fixed point Q is unstable (going from an unstable node,
orange to an unstable focus, pink) but becomes stable for pD ≥ 0.35 (as a stable focus, blue).
For slow oscillations (a 1) the population invariably goes extinct because Q remains unstable
for extended periods. Note that in this case the initial condition might matter, i.e. whether
the S or D scenario applies first. While this indeed affects the trajectories it does not alter the
eventual outcome, see Fig. 4. In contrast, for comparable timescales (a ≈ 1) or fast oscillations
(a  1), Q is moving fast and changes stability frequently with the net effect that trajectories
are attracted towards Q and the population manages to escape extinction. More specifically, for
a ≈ 1 or larger, the coexistence region essentially reflects the averaged case but as a decreases,
more and more initial conditions lead to extinction. Conversely, for larger a, the sizes of the two
basins seem no longer affected for large a (comparing a = 1 and a = 10), which suggests an
upper limit for the basin leading to extinction.
B. Variation of the rate of return
Changes in the richness of biological environments, or the economic situation of governing bod-
ies in social settings, can be captured by varying the multiplication factor r. For the traditional,
linear PG game (ω = 1) we consider r(t) = 3 sin(at+ δ) + 4.5, which ensures 1 < r(t) < N for
N = 8. As before, a relates the timescales of the eco-evolutionary dynamics and environmental
fluctuations and δ to the phase.
Again, for comparable timescales (a ≈ 1), or fast oscillations (a  1), the qualitative dy-
namics is well captured by the average multiplication factor, r¯ = 4.5, which also extends to
non-linear PG’s (ω 6= 1). Observing the dynamics at fixed, incremental values of r from 1 to 8 in
discrete steps of ∆r = 0.05, we find that for small r the fixed point Q is missing and extinction
is inevitable. Q only appears at r = 2.2 but is still unstable. Only for r = 2.8, Q turns into a
stable fixed point and renders co-existence possible up to r = 7.35 at which point Q disappears
again and homogenous cooperation becomes a possible stable outcome for most of the initial
conditions. However, the trajectories for the oscillating r(t) are strikingly different, see Fig. 5 –
extinction for slow oscillations (small a), oscillating trajectories for a ≈ 1 and co-existence for
fast oscillations (large a).
C. Variation of synergy/discounting
In order to mimic marginal benefits of joining PG interactions that change over time, we
introduce temporal variation in the synergy/discounting parameter, ω(t). This reflects another
form of changes to resource abundance or wealth as compared to variable rates of return, r(t).
9
FIG. 4. Eco-evolutionary dynamics under environmental fluctuations: oscillations between interaction
types, pD(t). In scenario D benefits are discounted, ωD = 0.9, with a rate of return of rD = 4.2, as compared to scenario
S where benefits are synergistically enhanced, ωS = 1.1, but at a reduced rate of return, rS = 2.1. The probability for each
type of interaction oscillates over time according to pD(t) = (sin(at+ δ) + 1)/2 (top row) with a = {0.1, 1, 10} (columns). The
fixed point Q is stable for larger pD(t) (blue) and unstable for smaller ones (red, orange). The dynamics for the three phases
δ = {pi/2, 0,−pi/2} labelled (i), (ii) and (iii) are shown in the bottom three rows. Trajectories are obtained by numerically
integrating Eq. 4 with a grain of 0.1 and those leading to extinction are coloured black while those surviving are green. The
background colours are obtained by integrating from initial conditions with a finer grain of 0.01. When compared to the average
interaction (D + S)/2, i.e. when pD(t) = 0.5 (Fig. 10), the panel for a = 1 and a = 10 are in good qualitative agreement
(sample trajectory (red, dashed) plotted in a = 10 (i)). For a = 0.1 the trajectories follow different paths but all lead eventually
to extinction. Even when beginning with coexistence (i), this is only transient as pD(t) eventually renders Q unstable and
leads the trajectories to extinction from which there is no recovery. Parameters: N = 8 and d = 0.5.
10
FIG. 5. Eco-evolutionary dynamics under environmental fluctuations: variable rates of return, r(t). The
dynamics are depicted for oscillating rates of return, r(t) = 3 sin(at + δ) + 4.5 (top row), three timescales a = {0.1, 1.0, 10}
(columns), and three phases δ = {pi/2, 0,−pi/2} (last three rows). The fixed point Q is stable if r(t) lies in the yellow or blue
regions, stable for red or orange and absent in white regions. The trajectories for comparable and fast ecological timescales
are again in good agreement with the dynamics based on the average return, r¯ = 4.5, which exhibits coexistence (Fig. 10). A
sample trajectory (red, dashed) for r¯ = 4.5 is plotted for a = 10 (i). For comparable timescales (a = 1) trajectories oscillate in
response to the changing location and stability of Q, whereas for fast oscillations environmental changes occur faster than the
population can react, which results in an averaging effect. For slower oscillations extinction is inevitable but the initial phase
of r(t) determines the trajectory and thus the time to extinction. In particular, starting with a high rate of return, (i), the
population persists for a longer time. Parameters: N = 8 and d = 0.5.
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Implementing periodically oscillating ω(t) turns out to be more challenging because the range
for discounting is bounded, ω ∈ (0, 1), whereas the range for synergy is not, ω ∈ (1,∞). Because
of this asymmetry, we chose
ω(t) =

1
1 + sin(at+ δ)
if sin(at+ δ) ≥ 0 (discounting)
1− sin(at+ δ) if sin(at+ δ) < 0 (synergy).
(6)
This ensures that the heaviest discounting, here 1/2, is counterbalanced by the strongest synergy,
here 2. As before, a relates the timescales of environmental fluctuations and eco-evolutionary
dynamics and δ tunes the phase of the oscillation. The asymmetry in the range of discounting
and of synergy makes the appropriate derivation of the average discounting/synergy, ω¯, difficult.
Since the arithmetic mean would overestimate the effect of synergy, we choose the geometric
mean, which is ω¯ ≈ 1. Interestingly, however, the characteristics of trajectories for ω(t) turn out
to be very different from the dynamics for the average ω¯ – regardless of the derivation of ω¯, see
Fig. 6 and Fig. 10. For comparable or fast oscillations in ω(t), most initial conditions lead to
homogeneous cooperation at high densities. This outcome can be attributed to the fact that for
most ω ∈ [0.5, 2] the homogenous cooperator equilibrium is stable. However, for slow oscillations
the evolutionary outcome becomes highly susceptible to the initial configuration as well as the
initial phase of ω(t), either leading to extinction or homogenous cooperator populations. In
particular, for very slow oscillations, a  1, extinction is inevitable because it represents the
only stable state for extended periods of time. This is in stark contrast to the dynamics for the
average ω¯ = 1, which suggests persistence of the population and co-existence of cooperators
and defectors for most initial configurations [72]. The discrepancy between the dynamics for
the mean ω¯, see Fig. 10, and the trajectories for oscillating ω, see Fig. 6, arises because the
gradient of selection, F (f, z) is non-linear with respect to ω, which means that the mean of the
gradient is not the same as the gradient of the mean, see App. C for details. In contrast, the
gradient F (f, z) is linear in r, which then supports the agreement between the dynamics for r¯
and oscillating rates of return, c.f. Fig. 5 and Fig. 10.
IV. DISCUSSION
Evolutionary models of social interactions traditionally assume a separation of timescales from
ecological processes such that evolutionary selection always acts on ecological equilibria. How-
ever, ecological ‘equilibria’ may not simply refer to stable population sizes but also oscillatory
dynamics based on stable limit cycles and a clear separation of timescales may not always apply.
Nevertheless, two prominent theoretical frameworks for modelling frequency-dependent evolu-
tionary processes neglect ecological changes: (i) the deterministic replicator dynamics [33, 34]
assumes infinite population sizes and tracks only relative abundances of strategies and (ii) the
stochastic dynamics of the (frequency dependent) Moran process [35, 56] assumes that the pop-
ulation size is fixed. Implicitly this assumes that the carrying capacity is independent of the
12
FIG. 6. Eco-evolutionary dynamics under environmental fluctuations: variable synergy/discounting, ω(t).
For periodic oscillations between synergy and discounting, we vary ω ∈ [0.5, 2] according to Eq. 6 (top row) and illustrate
the dynamics for three timescales a = {0.1, 1.0, 10} (columns), and three phases δ = {pi/2, 0,−pi/2} (rows (i), (ii) and (iii)).
For comparison, a sample trajectory (red, dashed) is shown for the dynamics of the mean, ω¯ = 1 (panel (i), a = 10; c.f.
Fig. 10). Interestingly, in the long run all trajectories either lead to extinction of the entire population (black trajectories) or
to the extinction of defectors (green trajectories) resulting in pure cooperator populations, regardless of the initial phase or the
timescale of oscillations. Similarly, for sufficiently fast oscillations (a = 1 and a = 10) the basins of attraction of each outcome
are hardly affected by phase or timescale. In contrast, for slow oscillations (a = 0.1) the basins of attraction sensitively depend
on the initial phase and the population likely goes extinct if it takes too long before ω enters the synergistic regime. With a
negative a, if the oscillations are slow i.e. a = −0.1, the dynamics in case of (ii) are qualitatively different: as ω enters the
synergistic regime first due to slow oscillations most trajectories have enough time to move towards the all cooperator edge.
Parameters: N = 8, r = 3 and d = 0.5. 13
type and abundance of strategies. For a complete understanding of evolutionary processes it
is therefore important to incorporate ecological changes. Especially evolutionary changes oc-
curring on timescales comparable to ecological changes necessitate an amalgamation into an
eco-evolutionary framework [23, 38, 73–77]. The importance of more comprehensive theoretical
approaches is supported by recent experimental results [21, 57].
We extended the eco-evolutionary framework for linear PG [38] to include more general forms
of social dilemmas by considering non-linear PG interactions through discounted or synergisti-
cally enhanced accumulation of benefits [26]. We further the study into the ecological domain by
considering extrinsic environmental variations, which affect the parameters of social interactions.
Intrinsic ecological changes affect the group size in public goods games through variable popula-
tion densities. This effect is similar to abstaining in public goods interactions, although voluntary
participation alone is insufficient to stabilize cooperation and relies on additional mechanisms
including spatial structure [78], punishment [79] or institutional incentives [80, 81].
Ecological dynamics essentially affects the group size of the public goods game. As group sizes
increase, so do intuitively the possibilities for social conflict. However, the reasons for forming
groups may qualitatively change the outcome. For example, defending a resource against a
common intruder can reduce social conflict even if group sizes increase[82]. Group size is also
essential in foraging [83] and variations may promote more egalitarian outcomes in the tragedy
of the commune [84, 85].
Including spatial dimensions either explicitly through unoccupied sites [39] or implicitly by
limiting reproductive opportunities [38] effectively reduces the interaction group size and shows
interesting parallels to voluntary public goods games [78]. Loners, who do not participate in the
public goods game receive benefits between that for mutual cooperation and mutual defection. An
abundance of loners implies smaller interaction group sizes which are favourable for cooperators.
As a consequence, the number of participants increases and the public good becomes susceptible
to exploitation by defectors. However, once defectors prevail, they are outperformed by defectors
and the cycle starts all over again. Although, the dynamics of such voluntary public goods
interactions does not admit stable interior fixed points as opposed to the ecological feedback
mechanisms discussed herein – unless, of course, further mechanisms such as institutionalised
incentives come into play [81].
Synergy and discounting generate non-linearities in the rate of return of the PG and hence
reflect diminishing returns or economies of scale, which are common features of group interactions
in biological and social systems [53, 86–88]. For example, in cooperative breeding cichlid fish
the optimum breeding group size changes depending on the perceived environmental threats
as compared to the potential benefits an additional member could provide to the group [89].
Additional members can dilute the risk of predation and/or actively take part in territory defence.
Costs due to enhanced brood parasitism, cannibalism and growth reduction [90, 91], however,
reduce the benefit leading to active eviction of immigrants [92–94]. In addition, the cichlid
example emphasizes an important ecological factor: variable risks. In the presence of a predator,
being in a group dilutes the risk per individual and also confuses the predator [95, 96]. Moreover,
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it might be possible to actively deter the predator, which would be impossible alone. However,
larger group sizes also imply larger visibility and higher encounter rates with predators [97]. Thus,
changes in environmental/ecological factors may alter the characteristics of social interactions
and, in turn, affect the evolutionary trajectory, as demonstrated in theory [49, 68, 98–100] and
experiments [21, 57, 101].
Here we considered two sources of ecological variation: intrinsic effects based on population
dynamics (Section II A) and extrinsic effects based on changes in the environment (Section III) ,
which are exemplified by three types of extrinsic, periodic variation in: (i) probabilities to engage
either in discounted (diminishing returns) or synergistically enhanced (economies of scale) PG
interactions, (ii) efficiency of the PG (varying rate of return, r), and (iii) non-linearity in the
accumulation of benefits (varying synergy/discounting, ω).
In the first two cases the characteristics of the trajectories generated under periodical oscilla-
tions are in good qualitative agreement with the corresponding average dynamics – the average of
the two games in (i), and the average multiplication factor r¯ in (ii) – provided that environmental
fluctuations are sufficiently fast. Interestingly, in scenario (iii) the dynamics based on the average
ω¯ suggests stable co-existence of cooperators and defectors at intermediate population densi-
ties, see [72]. The trajectories under fluctuating ω converge to high densities of homogeneous
cooperator populations. More specifically, oscillations in ω not only promote cooperation but
even eliminate defection, provided that the environmental fluctuations arise on a sufficiently fast
timescale. For sufficiently slow oscillations the population will inevitably go extinct in all three
cases, if for any value of the oscillating function, extinction is the only stable state. The initial
configuration and initial phase of environmental oscillations only affects the time and trajectories
leading to extinction.
Effects of ecological variation based on intrinsic or extrinsic sources can alter the fitness land-
scape or, similarly, pleiotropy between traits can change the effective selection pressure observed
on a single trait [102]. Seasonal variation can affect the epidemiology of important vector borne
diseases and could have triggered the evolution of plastic transmission strategies that match the
temporally varying density of mosquitoes [103]. Even the interaction patterns themselves can be
stochastic, furthermore complicating the population dynamics [104]. Comparisons between data
and predictions, which account for such complications, reflects a recent trend in experimental
studies [21, 105]. Including non-linear payoffs and temporally fluctuating interaction parameters
renders evolutionary game dynamics more complex but provides a window to investigate the rich
dynamical scenarios routinely seen in nature. Here we propose ways towards richer evolutionary
game theory.
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Appendix A: Average fitness of cooperators and defectors
The public goods interaction admits up to N players. However, at low population densities
it may be difficult to recruit N players and hence the effective interaction group size S ranges
from 2 to N . Note that at least two players are required for social interactions – a single player
gets a zero payoff. For a focal individual the probability that there are m cooperators among its
S − 1 co-players is given by (
S − 1
m
)(
x
1− z
)m(
y
1− z
)S−1−m
. (A.1)
Setting the costs of cooperation to c = 1, the payoffs for defectors and cooperators in a group
of size S are
PD(S) =
r
S
S−1∑
m=0
(
S − 1
m
)(
x
1− z
)m(
y
1− z
)S−1−m
1− ωm
1− ω (A.2a)
PC(S) =
r
S
− 1 + r
S
S−1∑
m=0
(
S − 1
m
)(
x
1− z
)m(
y
1− z
)S−1−m
ω
1− ωm
1− ω . (A.2b)
The probability that an individual interacts in a group of size S, i.e. faces S − 1 co-players, is(
N − 1
S − 1
)
(1− z)S−1zN−S. (A.3)
This yields the average payoffs for cooperators and defectors:
fD =
N∑
S=2
(
N − 1
S − 1
)
(1− z)S−1zN−SPD(S) (A.4a)
fC =
N∑
S=2
(
N − 1
S − 1
)
(1− z)S−1zN−SPC(S), (A.4b)
which simplify to
fD =
r
N
1
1− z − x(1− ω)
[
(x(ω − 1) + 1)N − 1
ω − 1 −
x(1− zN)
1− z
]
(A.5a)
fC = fD − F (x, z), (A.5b)
with
F (x, z) = 1 + (r − 1)zN−1 − r
N
(1− x(1− ω))N − zN
1− z − x(1− ω) . (A.6)
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In the special case of ω = 1 this reduces to a function in z alone [38]. Effects of fluctuating pop-
ulation densities on the characteristics of evolutionary games can be investigated by considering
the fitness of the two strategies, Eq. A.5, at particular densities, see Fig. 7. For discounting,
ω < 1, the resulting interactions are either dominance or co-existence games, whereas for synergy,
ω > 1, the resulting interactions are either bi-stable or dominance of cooperators (by-product
mutualism). In either case the population dynamics is capable of triggering a qualitative change
in the type of interaction because the population density determines the average interaction
group size S. At sufficiently low densities S < r holds, which supports cooperators, while at
higher densities S > r holds and favours defectors.
1. Homogeneous population
If the population consists of only defectors, x = 0, their average payoff is fD = 0 and we
have y˙ < 0. Thus, defectors continue to decrease in abundance and eventually go extinct. In
contrast, in a population of only cooperators, y = 0, the dynamics of the cooperator density is
given by x˙ = x(zfC − d) and their average fitness, fC , from Eq. A.5 simplifies to
fC =

(1− r)(1− (1− x)N−1) if ω = 1
(1− r)(1− x)N−1 + r
(
(x(ω − 1) + 1)N − 1)
N(ω − 1)x − 1 otherwise.
(A.7)
Apart from the trivial fixed point x = 0, which marks extinction, further fixed points may exist
whenever d = zfC , see Fig. 8. For ω = 1 an explicit expression for the maximum death rate
that a population of only cooperators can sustain is given by dmax = (r− 1)(N − 1)N−N/(N−1).
For d > dmax the population invariably goes extinct. For d < dmax the population may persist
provided that the initial population density is sufficiently high. Unfortunately, for general ω (and
N) analytical expressions for dmax are not accessible. However, for ω > 1 cooperators can sustain
greater death rates while the converse holds for ω < 1, see Fig. 8. If the density of cooperators
is low then the benefits produced by the public good are unable to offset the death rate and the
population goes extinct. The threshold density required to sustain the population decreases with
increasing ω, i.e. moving from discounted to synergistically enhanced benefits. In ecology, density
dependent effects reflecting difficulties in finding interaction partners (or mates) are referred to
as the Allee effect [106].
Appendix B: Fixed points and stability
In order to determine the stability of the interior fixed points, Q and P, we need to resort
to numerical evaluations of the trace, τ , and determinant, ∆, of the Jacobian of Eq. 5 at each
interior fixed point. The interior fixed points are given by non-trivial solutions to f˙ = 0 and
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FIG. 7. Average payoffs for different ecological scenarios. The payoff for cooperators, fC (solid, blue), and
defectors, fD (dotted, red), are shown at high (left, z = 1/4), middle (centre, z = 1/2), and low (right, z = 3/4) population
densities, under discounting (rows (a) and (b), ω = 0.6) and synergy (rows (c) and (d), ω = 1.2), as well as for low (rows
(a) and (d), r = 3) and high (rows (b) and (c), r = 3) multiplication factors with cost c = 1 and N = 8. Together this can
generate the four characteristic scenarios of social dilemmas. For example, at z = 1/2 (centre column), defectors dominate in
(a), co-existence in (b), cooperators dominate in (c) (by-product mutualism), and bi-stability in (d) (coordination game). The
characteristics of the game change with population density because low densities support cooperators whereas high densities
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z˙ = 0, see Eq. 5. From z˙ = 0 follows that
feq =
d
(r − 1)z(1− zN−1) (A.1)
and similarly, f˙ = 0 requires that F (feq, z) = 0 where
F (feq, z) = 1 + (r − 1)zN−1 − r
N
(1− feq(1− z)(1− ω))N − zN
1− z − feq(1− z)(1− ω) , (A.2)
which implicitly defines zeq and may admit several solutions in [0, 1]. Unfortunately zeq is analyt-
ically inaccessible. Numerical analysis shows that depending on r and N there are zero, one or
two solutions, which corresponds to no interior fixed point, one fixed point Q or two fixed points
Q and P. Calculating the Jacobian at Q and P using F (feq, zeq) = 0 and Eq. A.1 yields,
J =
(
−zf(1− f)∂F (f,z)
∂f
−zf(1− f)∂F (f,z)
∂z
−(r − 1)(1− z)z(1− zN−1) −(r − 1)(1− z)f(1−NzN−1)
)
. (A.3)
The trace τ and determinant ∆ are then given by,
τ = − f
[
(r − 1)(1− z) (1−NzN−1)+ z(1− f)∂F (f, z)
∂f
]
, (A.4)
∆ = f(1− f)z(1− z)(r − 1)
[
f
(
1−NzN−1) ∂F (f, z)
∂f
− z (1− zN−1) ∂F (f, z)
∂z
]
. (A.5)
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Numerical evaluations of τ and ∆ for both internal fixed points P andQ reveal thatQ can exhibit
a variety of dynamical properties but interestingly, P, whenever present, is always a saddle point,
∆ < 0. As ω changes, the fixed point Q follows a curve through the space spanned by τ and
∆, see Fig. 9.
For strong discounting (small ω) no interior fixed point exists and the population goes invari-
ably extinct. As ω increases one interior fixed point may appear through a transcritical bifurcation
or two fixed points through a saddle node bifurcation. The presence, location and stability of
the fixed points Q and P is analytically inaccessible (except when ω = 1 [38, 55]) and has been
determined numerically Fig. 9. Since in the absence of synergy or discounting, ω = 1, at most a
single interior fixed point exists, the second interior fixed point disappears through a transcritical
bifurcation (leaving the (1− z, f)-plane), while ω is still in the discounting regime. The interior
fixed point then undergoes a Hopf-bifurcation – either sub- or super-critical depending on the
game parameters [55]. In the synergistic regime, a second interior fixed may (again) appear and
for still higher ω the two interior fixed points collide and disappear in another saddle node bifur-
cation or one interior fixed point disappears through a transcritical bifurcation. Finally, for strong
synergistic effects defectors always go extinct leaving a homogenous population of cooperators
behind. Interactive simulations provide opportunities for further online explorations of the rich
eco-evolutionary dynamics [72].
Typically, Q passes through various phases of stability (illustrated by the cartoons for local
stability) – starting as an unstable node at low ω, turning into an unstable focus, then a stable
focus and finally into a stable node before Q disappears at high ω. Since τ is polynomial in ω
and ω is continuous, the fixed point becomes a centre (degenerate focus) for particular values of
ω.
Appendix C: Average dynamics under oscillating environments
The trajectories calculated using the oscillating functions have been shown in the main text
for (i) variation in the interaction types, Fig. 4; (ii) variation in the rate of return, Fig. 5;
and (iii) variation in the synergy/discounting factor, Fig. 6. Typically assuming a separation of
timescales between the faster environmental oscillations and the slower evolutionary dynamics,
the environmental effects can be averaged out. Here we show the dynamics, which emerges
following this assumption in Fig. 10.
For fast and even comparable timescales between the oscillations in the interaction types and
the rate of return we do indeed see the trajectories reflecting qualitatively similar dynamics as
that for the average (compare Figures 4, 5 with left and middle panels in Fig. 10). For oscillating
synergy/discounting ω, however, neither fast nor comparable timescales recover the dynamics
for the average, ω¯ (compare Fig. 6 and Fig. 10, right panel). One reason that the dynamics is
well captured by the average in the case of oscillating rates of returns, r, but not for oscillating
synergy/discounting, ω, is that the gradient of selection F (f, z) is a linear function of r whereas it
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FIG. 9. Stability analysis of the interior fixed points while varying the synergy/discounting parameter
ω. Parameters are the same as in Fig. 1: N = 8, d = 0.5 (a) r = 2.2 (b) r = 2.7 (c) r = 2.8 (d) r = 5. For ω = 1 at most
a single fixed point Q can exist in the interior of the (1 − z, f)-phase plane. Varying the synergy/discounting parameter ω,
another fixed point P may appear. Whenever P exists, it is always a saddle, ∆ < 0. Therefore we track only the stability and
dynamical characteristics of Q by following its trajectory through the space spanned by the determinant ∆ and the trace τ
of the Jacobian matrix, Eq. A.3, as a function of ω. The curves τ = 0 and τ2 − 4∆ = 0 (parabola) divide the space in four
regions with different dynamical features as indicated in panel (a). Typically, Q appears as an unstable node at low ω. As ω
increases, Q first turns into an unstable focus, then a stable focus and usually ends up as a stable node before disappearing
again. Note that not all dynamical regimes may be observed for all parameters. For example, in (d) Q already appears as a
stable focus. The presence of the second fixed point P is indicated by open circles.
is nonlinear in ω. In order to illustrate this difference, we consider Jensen’s inequality, which states
that the average of a non-linear function is different from the function evaluated at the average
of a random variable [107, 108]. More specifically, we consider two Gaussian random variables, R
and Ω, centered around r¯ = 4.5 and ω¯ = 1, respectively, with variance 1. To avoid meaningless
negative values, the distribution is symmetrically truncated at 0. From the linearity in r follows
that E(F (f, z)[R]) = F (f, z)[E(R)] for fixed N and ω. As a consequence the dynamics for
fluctuating r matches that of r¯, provided that fluctuations arise on sufficiently fast time scales.
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FIG. 10. Dynamics under average of the environmental oscillations Taking the average of the environmental
oscillations allows us to analytically evaluate the dynamics and the fixed points. For a variation in interaction types, the
discounting and synergistic scenarios oscillate with probability pD(t) = (sin(at) + 1)/2. Here taking the average value of
pD(t) = 0.5 such that we have (D+S)/2 the dynamics is visualised in the left panel with relevant parameters being ωD = 0.9,
ωS = 1.1, rD = 4.2, rS = 2.1. For a variation in the rate of return, oscillating as per r(t) = 3 sin(at) + 4.5, the average is
r¯ = 4.5 as shown in the central panel with ω = 1. For a variation in the synergy/discounting parameter, oscillating as per
Eq. 6, the geometric average is ω¯ = 1 resulting in the dynamics as visualised in the right panel for r = 3. For all scenarios, we
have N = 8 and d = 0.5.
In contrast, E(F (f, z)[Ω]) 6= F (f, z)[E(Ω)] for fixed N and r, see Fig. 11. It turns out that the
function of the mean exceeds the mean of the function, E(F (f, z)[Ω]) < F (f, z)[E(Ω)]. Since
F (f, z) denotes the advantage of defectors over cooperators, it follows that fluctuations in ω are
beneficial for cooperation and has been verified for various r.
If environmental variations occur at a slower timescale than the evolutionary dynamics then
the results are drastically different from the averages (compare left columns in Figures Figures 4, 5
and 6 with the averages in Fig. 10). In these cases even the phase, in which the system enters
the particular scenarios, is important for the trajectories eventual unravelling.
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